According to Rail Safety Advisory Letters issued by the Transportation Safety Board of Canada on July 19, 2013, the incident is summarized as follows.

At approximately 10:45 p.m. Eastern Daylight Time (EDT) on July 5, 2013, MMA train 2 was proceeding eastward from Montreal, Quebec, to St. John, New Brunswick.  The train was approximately 4,700 feet long and weighed over 10,000 tons.  It consisted of five locomotives, a loaded box car, and 72 loaded tank cars containing petroleum crude oil (U.S. DOT Hazard Class 3, UN 1267).  At approximately 11:00 p.m. the train stopped near milepost 7.40 near Nantes, Quebec.  At that location the operator of the train secured it and departed, leaving the train unattended on mainline track with a descending grade of approximately 1.2 percent.  At around 11:50 p.m. a local resident reported a fire on the controlling locomotive (MMA 5017) of the train.  The local fire department was called and responded with another MMA employee.  At approximately midnight, the controlling locomotive was shut down and the fire extinguished. After the fire was extinguished, the fire department and the MMA employee left the site.  At approximately 1:00 a.m. the next day (the early morning of July 6th) it appears that the train began rolling and picking up speed down the descending grade toward the town of Lac-Mégantic, Quebec, which sits approximately 30 miles from the United States-Canada border.  Near the center of town, the box car and 63 of the loaded tank cars derailed.  The locomotives, which separated from the train, traveled an additional 1/2 mile before coming to a stop.  A number of derailed tank cars released product resulting in multiple explosions and subsequent fires.  At this time, it is estimated that there were 42 fatalities and that 5 persons are still missing.  There was also extensive damage to the town, and approximately 2,000 people were evacuated from the surrounding area.  While the investigation is ongoing and the Transportation Safety Board of Canada has not reached any final conclusions, it has made a determination that the braking force applied to the train was insufficient to hold it on the 1.2-percent descending slope between Nantes and Lac-Mégantic.

View the letter as a pdf

Securement of Equipment and Trains Left Unattended

18 July 2013

Mr. Luc Bourdon (ASR)

Dear Mr. Bourdon:

SUBJECT:RAIL SAFETY ADVISORY LETTER – 09/13

Securement of Equipment and Trains Left Unattended

At about 22:45 Eastern Daylight Time (EDT) on 05 July 2013, Montreal Maine & Atlantic (MMA) freight train MMA 2 (the train) was proceeding eastward on the MMA Sherbrooke Subdivision, enroute from Montreal (QC) towards Saint John (NB). The train was 4701 feet long and weighed 10,287 tons. It was comprised of 5 head-end locomotives, a VB car used to house the locotrol equipment necessary for MMA’s single engineer train operation, 1 loaded box car used as a buffer followed by 72 non-pressure dangerous goods tank cars loaded with petroleum crude oil (Class 3, UN 1267).

At approximately 23:00, the train stopped at the designated MMA crew change point at Mile 7.40 near Nantes, Quebec. The single operator secured the train and departed for the evening leaving the lead locomotive unlocked and the train unattended on mainline track with a descending grade of 1.2%.

At about 23:50, a local resident reported a fire on the lead locomotive (MMA 5017) to the 911 emergency call centre. Subsequently the local fire department responded along with another MMA employee. At about midnight, similar with established operating practice, emergency shutdown procedures were initiated on the lead locomotive and the fire was extinguished. After extinguishing the fire, the second MMA employee and the fire department departed the site again leaving the train unattended.

Shortly before 01:00 on 06 July 2013, the train started to move and gathered speed as it rolled uncontrolled down the descending grade into the town of Lac-Mégantic, Quebec, 7.4 miles southeast of Nantes. While travelling at well in excess of the authorized speed, the train derailed near the centre of Lac-Mégantic. The locomotives separated from the train and came to a stop about ½ mile east of the derailment. The derailed equipment included the box car (buffer) and 63 tank cars.

Several derailed tank cars released product resulting in multiple explosions and subsequent fires causing an estimated 42 fatalities and 8 persons still missing, extensive damage to the town centre and precipitated the evacuation of about 2000 people from the surrounding area (TSB Occurrence No. R13D0054).

The ongoing investigation has determined that the braking force applied was insufficient to hold the train on the 1.2% descending slope between Nantes and Lac-Mégantic.

Over the years, the TSB has investigated a number of similar runaway accidents (see Appendix A). Each of these investigations brings into question the effectiveness of the Transport Canada (TC) approved Canadian Rail Operating Rules (CROR) Rule 112 entitled “Securing Equipment” and the standard railway operating procedures and practices utilized for performing that task.

Specifically CROR Rule 112 states:

(a)  When equipment is left at any point a sufficient number of hand brakes must be applied to prevent it from moving. Special instructions will indicate the minimum hand brake requirements for all locations where equipment is left. If equipment is left on a siding, it must be coupled to other equipment if any on such track unless it is necessary to provide separation at a public crossing at grade or elsewhere.

(b)  Before relying on the retarding force of the hand brake(s), whether leaving equipment or riding equipment to rest, the effectiveness of the hand brake(s) must be tested by fully applying the hand brake(s) and moving the cut of cars slightly to ensure sufficient retarding force is present to prevent the equipment from moving. When leaving a cut of cars secured, and after completion of this test, the cut should be observed while pulling away to ensure slack action has settled and that the cars remain in place.

(c)  Application of hand brakes must not be made while equipment is being pulled or shoved.

Trains are required to be secured in accordance with CROR Rule 112 in addition to any related railway company special instructions which vary from company to company. While most railway special instructions specify the minimum number of hand brakes needed in general operating conditions, they do not always provide the number of hand brakes required under specific conditions. In many cases, it is left up to the operating employee to determine the number of hand brakes to apply. The employee must take into consideration the slope or grade of the track and the approximate tonnage of the equipment to be secured at that location.

In addition, TSB investigation R96C0172 previously established that that there was considerable variability in the effectiveness of the hand brake system on railway cars. The variability was associated with the design, condition and maintenance of the hand brake system, as well as with differences among operators with respect to their physical capabilities and personal technique used to apply the hand brakes. Specifically, the torque applied by the operating employee may not be proportional to the effective brake shoe force actually applied. In other words, high torque does not necessarily generate a high braking force. This variability was not widely understood at the time of the investigation and could still present a risk particularly with new employees.

More recently, to add to the complexity, TSB investigation R12E0004 identified that the push –pull test used by railways to satisfy CROR Rule 112 (b) does not always adequately verify if the braking force of the hand brake application was sufficient to hold the cars.

CROR Rule 112 ensures that hand brakes are applied to prevent unwanted movement of the train while providing flexibility for a railway’s operational needs. However, CROR Rule 112 is not specific enough in that it does not indicate the number of hand brakes necessary to hold a given train tonnage on various grades and it continues to be left up to the operating employee to determine the number of hand brakes to apply. Furthermore, it has been demonstrated that the push–pull test is not always a good indicator of whether an adequate number of hand brakes have been applied and not all handbrakes are effective even when properly applied. Considering all these risks, Transport Canada may wish to review CROR Rule 112 and all related railway special instructions to ensure that equipment and trains left unattended are properly secured in order to prevent unintended movements.

Yours sincerely,

Original signed by Robert Johnston

Robert Johnston

Acting Director

Investigation Operations Rail/Pipeline

Attachment: Appendix A

Cc: Edward A. Burkhardt

Chairman of the Board

Rail World Inc.

Michael Bourque

President & Chief Executive Officer

The Railway Association of Canada

No. H096/13

For release – July 23, 2013

OTTAWA — Today, Transport Canada announced an emergency directive pursuant to section 33 of the Railway Safety Act to increase rail safety.

Although the cause of the accident in Lac-Mégantic remains unknown at this time, Transport Canada is moving forward to build upon the safety advisories received last Friday from the Transportation Safety Board and further enhance existing safe railway operations and the security of railway transportation.

Transport Canada thanks all railway companies for their quick response in implementing this directive following the tragic events in Lac-Mégantic.

Effective immediately, the emergency directive requires all rail operators to:

• Ensure that no locomotive attached to one or more loaded tank cars transporting dangerous goods is operated with fewer than two qualified persons on a main track or sidings;
• Ensure that no locomotive attached to one or more loaded tank cars transporting dangerous goods is left unattended on a main track;
• Ensure, within five days of the issuance of the directive, that all unattended controlling locomotives on a main track and sidings are protected from unauthorized entry into the cab;
• Ensure the directional controls, commonly known as reversers, are removed from any unattended locomotives, preventing them from moving forward or backward, on a main track or sidings;
• Ensure that their company’s special instructions on hand brakes are applied to any locomotive attached to one or more cars that is left unattended for more than one hour on a main track or sidings;
• Ensure that, in addition to complying with their company’s special instructions on hand brakes referred to in the item immediately above, the automatic brake is set in full service position and the independent brake is fully applied for any locomotive attached to one or more cars that are left unattended for one hour or less on a main track or sidings.

The safety of Canadians is Transport Canada’s top priority.  The department is committed to working with the rail industry to examining any other means of improving rail safety.

Transport Canada has been in contact with the railway industry, and in particular with CN, CP and the Railway Association of Canada (RAC), to work together to promote the continued safety of Canada’s rail system.

The majority of railways maintain a culture of safety and security, as shown by the notable decline in derailments and train accidents over the past few years.

Transport Canada inspectors will continue to work in cooperation with the Transportation Safety Board as it conducts its investigation.

Transport Canada inspectors are at Lac-Mégantic determining whether there has been non-compliance with regulatory requirements.

Railway safety regulations exist to ensure the safety and protection of the public. If these regulations were not followed, the department will not hesitate to take action.

Contacts:

Media Relations
Transport Canada, Ottawa
613-993-0055

Over the years, the TSB has investigated a number of similar runaway accidents. A summary of several of the more significant accidents is appended below:

• R96C0172 (Edson) – On 12 August 1996, all 3 three occupants in the operating cab of the lead locomotive of Canadian National (CN) westward freight train No. 117 were fatally injured when their train, which was travelling at about 54 mph, collided head-on with a cut of 20 runaway cars moving eastward at about 30 mph, some six miles east of Edson, Alberta. The runaway cars had been left on a track in Edson Yard by a crew who had applied hand brakes to 2 covered hopper cars. The crew had little supervision to ensure that the company’s car securement procedures were being correctly applied. The performance of the hand brakes on that type of car was found to be highly variable, and the variability was not commonly known amongst operating employees. Although the crew thought the cars had been secured, the resultant brake shoe force on the two cars was insufficient to prevent movement. Thus, the cut of 20 cars slowly moved east and accelerated toward the main track.
• R09T0057 (Nanticoke) – On 11 February 2009 at 2118 Eastern Standard Time, the Southern Ontario Railway 0900 Hagersville Switcher, consisting of 4 locomotives and 43 cars, ran uncontrolled from Mile 0.10 to Mile 1.9 of the Hydro Spur track. The train reached a speed of 20.7 mph before travelling over a split switch derail and derailing 9 loaded dangerous goods tank cars. Three tank cars loaded with gasoline (UN 1203) were breached and released approximately 31 000 litres of gasoline. Two nearby homes were evacuated; there were no injuries.

  The investigation determined that the accident occurred when the crew left the train unattended on a one per cent descending grade, without the train being properly secured. Subsequently, the train rolled uncontrolled downgrade for 1.4 miles, across an unprotected crossing, reaching a speed of 20.7 mph before it encountered a split switch derail and derailed the nine tail-end cars. With only one crew member left at the end of the shift, the other crew members did not have an opportunity to verify whether the train was properly secured.

• R11Q0056 (Doree) – On 11 December 2011, as freight train LIM-55 was descending a long steep grade, the locomotive engineer, unable to control the train speed using the dynamic and automatic brakes, applied the emergency brakes at Mile 68.00 of the Wacouna Subdivision to stop his movement. One hour later, the train ran away, descending the grade for a distance of almost 15 miles and reaching a maximum speed of 63 mph. The train finally came to a stop at Mile 52.80. No one was injured and there was no derailment.

  The investigation determined that 1 hour after the emergency brakes were applied and the train came to a stop, the air brakes released and, because the braking force applied by the hand brakes was insufficient, the train ran away. Without specific instructions that take into consideration local conditions, there is a risk of underestimating the number of hand brakes required to secure a train on a steep grade and preventing it from running away.

• R12E0004 (Hanlon) – On 18 January 2012, at 1212 Mountain Standard Time, 13 loaded coal cars, which were running uncontrolled northward from the Hanlon siding, Mile 41.7 on the Grande Cache Subdivision, collided with stationary train A45951-16 at Mile 44.5. Nine of the 13 cars and the 3 leading locomotives from the train derailed. Two crew members sustained minor injuries and were treated on site. The 3rd crew member was seriously injured and was air lifted to hospital in Hinton, Alberta. Approximately 2800 litres of fuel and 740 tons of coal were spilled. About 250 feet of track was damaged.

  The investigation determined that the conductor’s belief that the cars were on level ground likely led to the conclusion that 1 hand brake was sufficient to secure the cut of cars. When the braking force from the train brakes was sufficiently reduced due to bleeding off of the air in the cars’ brake cylinders, the retarding force of the 1 applied hand brake could not resist the gravitational force of the 13 loaded coal cars. In addition, because the brake effectiveness test was conducted by attempting to push the cars upgrade, it did not adequately verify if the braking force of the hand brake application was sufficient to hold the cars.

Contact Information: Ben Washburn, 913-551-7364, washburn.ben@epa.gov

(Lenexa, Kan., Aug. 19, 2013) – An Illinois pesticide manufacturer and a Nebraska company that sold some of its fly control products have agreed to pay civil penalties totaling $84,387 to EPA to settle allegations related to their roles in the distribution or sale of misbranded pesticides.

In separate administrative settlement agreements filed by EPA Region 7 in Lenexa, Kan.:

• Wellmark International, Inc., of Schaumburg, Ill., has agreed to pay a $44,704 civil penalty to resolve 19 violations of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) related to the Nebraska company’s distribution of its RF2025 Tub and RF2002 Block products from 2009 to 2011.

• Vitalix, Inc., of Alliance, Neb., has agreed to pay a $39,683 civil penalty to resolve 19 violations of FIFRA related to its sales of the RF2025 Tub misbranded as #5 Altosid IGR Fly Tub, and of the RF2002 Block product misbranded as Mineralix Fly Tub with Altosid IGR#11.

EPA alleged that the two fly control products were either misbranded with labels that did not include required cautionary language, or were distributed in conjunction with claims that differed from the pesticide registration information filed with EPA.

Under FIFRA, distributors of pesticides must ensure that the information on their products’ labels contains the same required cautionary information as found on the labels filed with EPA by the pesticides’ registrants, and that those pesticides are not distributed with claims that differ from the registration information filed with EPA.

Under federal regulations, a pesticide’s supplemental distributor – in this case, Vitalix – and its registrant – in this case, Wellmark International – are both responsible for ensuring that the distributor’s product is in compliance with FIFRA and the terms of the product’s registration.

Through their respective settlements with EPA, Wellmark International and Vitalix have certified that they are now in compliance with FIFRA and its regulations.

The news release doesn’t indicate if a recall of the mis-labeled pesticides was required by FIFRA.  If it was, and if the recalled pesticides were to be disposed of, the pesticide manufacturers could take advantage of Universal Waste regulations to avoid the heavier regulatory burden under the hazardous waste regulations.  Read here about Universal Waste Pesticides.

News Release
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
New England Regional Office
August 23, 2013

Contact: David Deegan, (617) 918-1017

(Boston, Mass. – August 23, 2013) – A commercial waste handler in Rhode Island has agreed to pay a fine of $58,278 and to spend $252,152 to clean hazardous chemicals out of approximately 60 schools in Rhode Island and Massachusetts in order to settle EPA claims that the company violated state and federal hazardous waste laws at a facility in Providence, R.I.

Northland Environmental and its owner, PSC Environmental Services, will remove chemicals from 60 high schools and middle schools within a 50-mile radius of their Providence facility at 275 Allens Ave. where the violations occurred. The companies have agreed to pack up and properly dispose of both hazardous and non-hazardous wastes stored at the schools; to do hazardous waste training for science and art teachers; and to purchase safety equipment such as storage cabinets for flammable chemicals, eye washes and deluge showers for classrooms where hazardous chemicals are used. This project will be done over 18 months during times when the schools are closed.

EPA alleged that Northland/PSC Environmental Services violated the federal Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) and state hazardous waste laws by failing to properly identify certain hazardous wastes and failing to properly maintain hazardous waste tanks and containers. These alleged violations could have resulted in the release of hazardous wastes to the environment. The company also stored incompatible hazardous wastes next to one another, creating a potential for fire or explosions. The company quickly came into compliance after the violations were identified.

“All facilities that generate or manage hazardous wastes have an obligation to make sure they carefully adhere to the environmental requirements that result in safer, cleaner communities,” said Curt Spalding, regional administrator of EPA’s New England office. “This case will have a positive outcome, since the projects under this settlement will help provide safer classrooms at many schools in Rhode Island and Massachusetts.”

The school clean outs will involve removing outdated and unwanted chemicals from schools at no cost to the participating schools. Chemical management is often a low priority for schools and it is not uncommon for school science departments to have outdated and unneeded stock chemicals present.

“I want to thank the EPA and the Cranston School Department for working cooperatively to provide a safe environment for our students,” said City of Cranston Mayor Allan Fung.

“We are pleased to see funds from EPA actions like this reinvested in making Rhode Island a cleaner and safer place,” said Terrence Gray, P.E., Associate Director for Air, Waste and Compliance at the RI Department of Environmental Management.  “For many years, DEM has directly supported school districts across Rhode Island by removing old and unnecessary chemicals, but that effort has always been limited by the resources we have available. This recent investment extends this important initiative so that more of these dangerous materials can be taken out of our schools, providing a much safer environment for students and educators.”

“The science classroom environment is of the utmost importance as we work to support teaching and learning for students and teachers. Safety is our first concern so we were delighted to have a partnership with the EPA Integrated Chemical Management Program (ICM) who worked with our science teachers to inventory, organize chemicals, with regards to safety and to the benefit of classroom use. Working with this program provided our teachers with invaluable insights with regards to managing chemical supplies. The ultimate goal is to maximize safety and learning of science inquiry in Cranston Public Schools,” said Dr. Judith Lundsten, Superintendant Cranston Public Schools.

Rhode Island schools within a 50-mile radius of the Northland facility were sent emails letting them know of this opportunity to have toxic, hazardous, or chemicals prohibited by the state removed by participating in this project. Schools that were interested provided a list of the chemicals that need to be removed. Cranston, R.I. is using the opportunity to provide both East and West High School with chemical cleanouts before school starts on Aug. 27.

In addition to paying the fine and completing the environmental project, Northland/PSC has agreed to make sure the Providence facility remains in compliance with federal and state hazardous waste management regulations.

Northland/PSC’s Providence facility accepts and handles a broad spectrum of wastes including acids, alkalis, flammable wastes, water reactive wastes, cyanides, sulfides, oxidizers, toxic wastes, oily wastes, photochemical wastes and laboratory packs. Hazardous and non-hazardous wastes are received, stored and or consolidated and then shipped off site for treatment or disposal.

More information on hazardous waste management: http://www.epa.gov/region1/enforcement/waste/index.html

Once again, simple mistakes made early: failure to complete a hazardous waste determination; lead to more substantial violations of the RCRA regulations.  It is also important to note that one remedy required by the violation is to properly train personnel who generate, handle, treat, or dispose of hazardous waste or may respond to a hazardous waste emergency.  RCRA Hazardous Waste Personnel Training – required by 40 CFR 265.16 – is what I do.  Contact me to discuss your RCRA training needs.

#  #  #

Attachment: List of Schools provided with hazardous waste cleanup under this settlement:

RHODE ISLAND 

Barrington High School Barrington
Mt. Hope High School Bristol
Our Lady of Mount Carmel Bristol
Central Falls Senior High School Central Falls
Cranston High School East Cranston
Cranston High School West Cranston
New England Laborers’/Cranston Public Schools Construction Career Academy Cranston
Joseph McCourt Middle School Cumberland
East Providence High School East Providence
Burrillville High School Harrisville
Burrillville Middle School Harrisville
Johnston Senior High School Johnston
Lincoln Senior High School Lincoln
William M. Davies, Jr Career and Technical High School Lincoln
Rogers High School Newport
North Providence High School North Providence
Ponaganset High School North Scituate
North Smithfield High School North Smithfield
Blackstone Academy Charter School Pawtucket
William E. Tolman Senior High School Pawtucket
Portsmouth High School Portsmouth
DelSesto Middle School Providence
Mount Pleasant High School Providence
School One Providence
Smithfield High School Smithfield
Tiverton High School Tiverton
Curtis Corner Middle School Wakefield
Toll Gate High School Warwick
Pilgrim High School Warwick
Warwick Veterans Memorial HS Warwick
Chariho Regional High School Wood River Junction
Exeter-West Greenwich Regional High School West Greenwich
Westerly High School Westerly

MASSACHUSETTS 

Braintree High School Braintree
Brockton High School Brockton
B.M.C. Durfee High School Fall River
Malden High School Malden
Medford High School Medford
Middleborough High School Middleborough
Plymouth North High School Plymouth
Plymouth South High School Plymouth
North Quincy High School Quincy
Quincy High School Quincy
Randolph High School Randolph
Revere High School Revere
Saugus High School Saugus
Walpole High School Walpole
Waltham High School Waltham
Worcester Public Schools
– Burncoat Middle School  Worcester
– Forest Grove Middle School  Worcester
– Dr. Arthur F. Sullivan Middle School Worcester
– Worcester East Middle School Worcester
– Burncoat High School Worcester
– Claremont Academy Worcester
– Doherty Memorial High School Worcester
– North High School Worcester
– South High Community School Worcester
– University Park Campus School Worcester
– Worcester Technical High School Worcester

The Biennial Report is a requirement of the USEPA at 40 CFR 262.41 for certain hazardous waste generators and RCRA-permitted Treatment, Storage, and Disposal Facilities (TSDFs) that engage in regulated activity in the reporting year.  It is required to be submitted by March 1st of every even-numbered year for the previous reporting year.  Therefore, the report due March 1st, 2014 must report regulated activity that took place in calendar year 2013.  Facilities required by USEPA regulations to submit the Biennial Report are:

• Large Quantity Generators of hazardous waste that either ship waste off-site (within the U.S. only) for treatment, storage, or disposal or manage the waste on-site.  Only hazardous waste generated in the reporting year is reported.  Hazardous waste generated in a non-reporting year (for example:  2012) but shipped off-site for treatment, storage, or disposal in the reporting year (2013) is not subject to reporting.
• TSDFs subject to a RCRA operating permit that received hazardous waste from within the U.S. for on-site treatment, storage or disposal.  To be subject to reporting by March 1st, 2014, the hazardous waste must be received at the TSDF in 2013.

Facilities not required to submit the Biennial Report are:

• Small Quantity Generators of hazardous waste per §262.44.
• Conditionally Exempt Small Quantity Generators of hazardous waste per §261.5(b).
• An LQG that exported all of its hazardous waste outside the U.S. for treatment, storage, or disposal.  Facilities that export hazardous waste directly to a foreign country must file a separate Annual Report per §262.56.

If applicable, the Biennial Report must be completed using EPA Form 8700-13A and submitted to the USEPA regional office or the state environmental agency.  At a minimum, the Biennial Report must include:

• The EPA identification number, name, and address of the generator;
• The calendar year covered by the report;
• The EPA identification number, name, and address for each off-site treatment, storage, or disposal facility in the United States to which waste was shipped during the year;
• The name and EPA identification number of each transporter used during the reporting year for shipments to a treatment, storage or disposal facility within the United States;
• A description, EPA hazardous waste number (from 40 CFR part 261, subpart C or D), DOT hazard class, and quantity of each hazardous waste shipped off-site for shipments to a treatment, storage or disposal facility within the United States. This information must be listed by EPA identification number of each such off-site facility to which waste was shipped.
• A description of the efforts undertaken during the year to reduce the volume and toxicity of waste generated.
• A description of the changes in volume and toxicity of waste actually achieved during the year in comparison to previous years to the extent such information is available for years prior to 1984.
• The certification signed by the generator or authorized representative.  An “authorized representative” is a person responsible for the overall operation of the site (i.e., plant manager or superintendent, or a person of equal responsibility).

If you wish to get a jump on the March 1, 2014 due date for the 2013 report, you may wish to view this:  2013 Hazardous Waste Report Instructions and Form EPA Form 8700-13 A/B

Complicating matters is the fact that many states with authorized hazardous waste programs have imposed reporting requirements for the Biennial Report above and beyond those of the USEPA.  Refer to this contacts list:  http://www.epa.gov/epawaste/inforesources/data/form8700/contact.pdf to determine your state-specific reporting requirements.

Recordkeeping:

Pursuant to §262.40(b) A generator must keep a copy of each Biennial Report for a period of at least three years from the due date of the report.  The regulations do not specify that a copy of the Biennial Report must be maintained at the generator’s site.  Therefore, it would be acceptable for a copy to be maintained off-site (e.g. at a corporate or regional headquarters) as long as the generator is able to provide an inspector with reasonable access to the records.

If you are required to submit the Biennial Report, then you are also likely to be subject to the USEPA regulations at 40 CFR 265.16 that require annual training of all facility personnel who work with hazardous waste or may respond to a hazardous waste emergency.  Contact me to discuss the regulations and your training requirements.

The regulations of 40 CFR 265.17, like all of those in Part 265, apply primarily to hazardous waste treatment, storage, and disposal facilities (TSDFs).  However, there are several places in the hazardous waste regulations (USEPA & authorized states) where the regulations of Part 265 are applicable to both Large Quantity Generators and Small Quantity Generators of hazardous waste, LQGs & SQGs, respectively.  Examples of this include, but are not limited to:

• The reference to 40 CFR 265, Subpart I from §262.34(a)(1)(i) applicable to LQGs.
  
• The reference to 40 CFR 265, Subpart C from §262.34(a)(4) applicable to LQGs.
• The reference to 40 CFR 265, Subpart I from §262.34(d)(2) applicable to SQGs.

In this case, compliance with §265.17 is required for an SQG who accumulates hazardous waste in tanks.  An understanding of the requirements of this section will therefore be helpful to all generators of hazardous waste. (more…)

When required on transport vehicles or freight containers (defined below), identification numbers for hazardous materials (found in Column 4 of the Hazardous Materials Table) must be displayed in one of three ways as detailed in 49 CFR 172.336.  The allowable methods for display of identification numbers are as follows:

• On orange panels with the specifications as detailed in §172.332(b),
• On a plain white square-on-point display configuration that has the same outside dimensions as a placard:  250 mm (9.84 inches) on a side, or;
• On a placard in conformance with the requirements of §172.332(c).

If a situation arises where both placards and the identification number are required but the display of the identification on the placard is prohibited per §172.334(a), then the identification number must be displayed on an orange panel or the plain white square-on-point display configuration.  Both must be displayed in association (i.e. next to) the required placard.

Definitions used in this article:

Transport vehicle means a cargo-carrying vehicle such as an automobile, van, tractor, truck, semitrailer, tank car or rail car used for the transportation of cargo by any mode. Each cargo-carrying body (trailer, rail car, etc.) is a separate transport vehicle.

Freight container means a reusable container having a volume of 64 cubic feet or more, designed and constructed to permit being lifted with its contents intact and intended primarily for containment of packages (in unit form) during transportation.

So, a question:  Is the display of the identification number in this photo in compliance with the Hazardous Material Regulations (HMR) of the PHMSA/USDOT?

The answer is yes.  The identification number seen in the photo (3082) applies to a Hazard Class 9 liquid.  Not having seen inside the truck, I will assume that it contains a bulk packaging (>119 gallons for a liquid) of a Class 9.  The transportation of a Class 9 in a bulk package inside a transport vehicle mandates the display of the identification number on all four sides of the vehicle.  The HMR do not, however, require the use of the Class 9 placard for domestic transportation (read my article to learn why a Class 9 placard is not required for domestic transportation).  In this case the carrier has opted to display the identification number on his vehicle without the Class 9 placard.

Something like this may catch your eye on the highway (it did mine, anyway) and cause you to wonder how it can be so.  A review of the regulations reveals the reason why.  Take the time to attend one of my Training Webinars and you’ll learn about the HazMat transportation regulations of the PHMSA/USDOT.